How to construct a test of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior by Rossiter, John
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
2003 
How to construct a test of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior 
John Rossiter 
University of Wollongong, jrossite@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers 
 Part of the Business Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rossiter, John, "How to construct a test of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior" (2003). Faculty of 
Business - Papers (Archive). 469. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/469 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
How to construct a test of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior 
Abstract 
Scientific knowledge in consumer behavior is defined as consisting of consumer behavior structural 
frameworks or models (microtheories) and well‐supported empirical generalizations in various areas of 
consumer behavior (microfindings). This re‐inquiry first examines a pioneering attempt to develop a test 
of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior, the Armstrong Test. The problems with that test are 
instructive in revealing threats to validity in test construction and analysis. Second, detailed steps are 
proposed for constructing a comprehensive, valid test of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior. Such 
a test should be useful for assessing the consumer behavior knowledge held by business educators, 
consultants, managers, market researchers, and business students. 
Keywords 
consumer, knowledge, scientific, test, behavior, construct 
Disciplines 
Business 
Publication Details 
Rossiter, J. R. (2003). How to construct a test of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 30 (2), 305-310. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/469 
305
 2003 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. ● Vol. 30 ● September 2003
All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2004/3002-0011$10.00
Re-Inquiries
How to Construct a Test of Scientific
Knowledge in Consumer Behavior
JOHN R. ROSSITER*
Scientific knowledge in consumer behavior is defined as consisting of consumer
behavior structural frameworks or models (microtheories) and well-supported em-
pirical generalizations in various areas of consumer behavior (microfindings). This
re-inquiry first examines a pioneering attempt to develop a test of scientific knowl-
edge in consumer behavior, the Armstrong Test. The problems with that test are
instructive in revealing threats to validity in test construction and analysis. Second,
detailed steps are proposed for constructing a comprehensive, valid test of scientific
knowledge in consumer behavior. Such a test should be useful for assessing the
consumer behavior knowledge held by business educators, consultants,managers,
market researchers, and business students.
How should a test of scientific knowledge in consumerbehavior be constructed? Armstrong, in this journal
(September 1991), pioneered the difficult task of construct-
ing a test of this type. But the test produced disturbing results
that demand a re-inquiry. According to this test, herein re-
ferred to as the Armstrong Test, experts in consumer be-
havior—consumer behavior academics and marketing man-
agers—demonstrated no more scientific knowledge of
consumer behavior than did tenth and eleventh grade high
school students in honors English classes. That is, the ex-
perts scored no better on the test than intelligent laypersons,
and thus the test failed to demonstrate known-groups valid-
ity. Similarly disturbing were the mean knowledge scores
obtained by the three groups, which were not much better
than chance. According to this test, none of the groups knew
*John R. Rossiter is research professor of marketing in the School of
Management, Marketing and Employment Relations, University of Wol-
longong, Wollongong NSW 2522, Australia (john_rossiter@uow.edu.au)
and professor of marketing on the visiting faculty in the Department of
Marketing Management, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus Uni-
versity, The Netherlands. The author thanks Scott Armstrong for providing
his test materials; Elizabeth Cowley, Grahame Dowling, Sandra Jones, and
especially Terry Shimp and Ale Smidts for their advice on a lengthier
previous version of the article; and is indebted to JCR editors David Glen
Mick and Kent Monroe as well as three JCR reviewers for their constructive
suggestions for preparation of the present version.
much about consumer behavior, which is a very questionable
outcome.
The present endeavor begins by identifying the constit-
uents of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior. The use
of “in” is deliberate because the reference, like the reference
of the Armstrong Test, is to scientific knowledge in the
consumer behavior domain (knowledge about the how and
why of consumer behavior) as contrasted with descriptive
knowledge “of” consumer behavior (knowing what typical
consumers think and do). See Hoch’s (1988) test for the
latter purpose. Following this conceptual discussion, a crit-
ical analysis of the Armstrong Test is offered that explains
why that test produced such disconcerting findings. Using
the conceptual discussion, and learning from the earlier at-
tempt, the re-inquiry concludes with detailed recommen-
dations for the construction of a valid test of scientific
knowledge in consumer behavior.
WHAT IS SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR?
To appreciate what a valid test would cover—and to un-
derstand what the Armstrong Test actually did cover—it is
instructive to consider what “scientific knowledge in con-
sumer behavior” would comprise. In the broader domain of
marketing, Rossiter (2001, 2002b) has proposed that de-
clarative knowledge (knowing what, as distinct from pro-
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cedural knowledge, or knowing how, which in any case
presumes accurate declarative knowledge) takes five forms:
(a) concepts, which are definitions of key constructs; (b)
structural frameworks, which relate concepts as descriptive
models and are thus descriptive microtheories; (c) empirical
generalizations, which are well-established beliefs about “if,
then” correlations between concepts, in other words, gen-
eralized findings; (d) strategic marketing management prin-
ciples, which are causal microtheories prescribing dynamic
“if, do” marketing actions; and (e) market research princi-
ples, which are causal microtheories prescribing “if, use”
problem-specific research techniques.
Applied to knowledge in consumer behavior as a subfield
of marketing, strategic marketing management principles,
form d above, would drop out, as these principles are in the
seller behavior subfield. Also excluded would be market
research principles, form e above, because these are a spe-
cialized subfield of marketing knowledge. The relevant
forms of knowledge in consumer behavior would therefore
be
1. Consumer behavior concepts—for example, involve-
ment, repeat-buying.
2. Consumer behavior structural frameworks—for ex-
ample, Howard’s (1977) three-stage models of exten-
sive problem solving, limited problem solving, and
routinized response behavior; the FCB advertising
planning grid (Vaughan 1980).
3. Consumer behavior empirical generalizations—for ex-
ample, Huff’s (1964) retail gravitation law; Ehren-
berg’s (1988) duplication-of-purchase law.
Among these forms, when one thinks of “scientific knowl-
edge” in a field, one is usually thinking of empirical gen-
eralizations—established findings in that field (see Hubbard
and Lindsay 2002; Marketing Science 1995; Uncles 2002).
However, knowledge of structural frameworks is similarly
important. Structural framework models such as Howard’s
three-stage models, Fishbein-type multiattribute attitude
models (Ahtola 1975), the Elaboration Likelihood Model
(Petty and Cacioppo 1986), various grid models, and check-
list models such as the extra “3P’s” that consumers look for
in services are useful knowledge contributions to consumer
behavior. It could be reasoned, therefore, that the most im-
portant forms of knowledge to test in consumer behavior
are structural frameworks (microtheories) and empirical gen-
eralizations (microfindings). Concepts, the most basic form
of knowledge, are subsumed in structural frameworks and
empirical generalizations. However, it is essential that the
concepts in structural frameworks and empirical generali-
zations are clearly translated into everyday language (oth-
erwise the test of knowing the structural frameworks or
empirical generalizations is confounded by lack of prior
knowledge of the technical terms in which they are stated).
WHAT DID THE ARMSTRONG TEST
MEASURE?
On the surface, the Armstrong Test might appear to be a
test of knowledge of empirical generalizations in consumer
behavior. The test presented hypotheses from 20 empirical
studies published in the Journal of Consumer Research, to-
gether with a brief description of the purpose and method of
each study, and asked respondents to predict the outcomes of
the tests of those hypotheses by indicating whether each hy-
pothesis was true or false. Thus, apparently, if a respondent
knew the empirical generalization relevant to that study, then
the respondent could use this knowledge to predict the specific
outcome. For example, one of the studies used in the Arms-
trong Test was Swinyard and Coney’s (1978) study of the
effects of advertising and personal telephone contact on voting
behavior; if the respondent knew that advertising tends to
have a small effect on behavioral intentions for high-involve-
ment choices and a large effect for low-involvement choices,
then the respondent would be able to correctly predict those
two outcomes for the study.
However, the stated purpose of the Armstrong Test was
much more ambitious than this. Armstrong set out to test
people’s knowledge of theories of consumer behavior, from
which generalizable findings might be inferred. Armstrong’s
unedited conclusion, given in his original working paper
(1989, pp. 18, 19), was that “the field [of consumer behavior]
has not been progressing as a science . . . [in that] the
theories available to academics do not help them in pre-
dicting the phenomena in their major field of interest.” This
is too idealistic; the respondent would have to know only
the relevant empirical generalization, not the theory behind
it, presuming there is one, to answer the questions.
But did the Armstrong Test achieve even the more limited
aim of testing people’s knowledge of empirical generali-
zations in consumer behavior? The method by which the
test was constructed, resulting in the procedure that partic-
ipants were asked to follow, suggests that this aim was not
achieved. For the test, participants were provided with a
two-page introduction to each study which outlined, in non-
technical language, the purpose of the study, sample,
method, and measures. The introduction deliberately ex-
cluded mention of prior studies and their findings, which
existed for 19 of the 20 studies (Armstrong 1991, p. 254).
Following the introduction was a list of the hypotheses of
the study, likewise stated in nontechnical language. For the
response task, participants had to indicate whether each of
the study’s hypotheses was true or false, that is, whether
the hypothesis was confirmed or disconfirmed. They could
alternatively answer “do not understand.”
The Question (Item) Content
The Armstrong Test can be criticized firstly and most
fundamentally for its question (item) content. Provision of
the introductions, without mention of prior studies, is likely
to have converted the participants’ task from the intended
purpose of judging whether the hypothesis was true in gen-
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eral (an empirical generalization) to one of judging whether
the hypothesis was true in particular, that is, whether the
finding was obtained in this one particular study given the
sample and method used in that study. In other words, it is
likely that respondents were led to make conditional judg-
ments about the truth or falsity of specific findings. The
introductions, which were completely specific, made it un-
likely that respondents would draw on knowledge of a gen-
eralization to predict a particular finding.
If participants made conditional judgments about the re-
sults of just the study described to them, this would eliminate
the advantage that consumer behavior academics might have
in their knowledge of previous studies on the topic and also
eliminate the advantage that consumer behavior academics
and marketing managers might have over high school stu-
dents in their knowledge of relevant empirical generaliza-
tions. The difficulty of making these conditional judgments
would also account for the low scores on the test, which
were little better than chance, or guesswork.
The Criterion for Correct Answers
A further count against the claims that the Armstrong Test
was measuring people’s knowledge of empirical generali-
zations in consumer behavior, let alone of the possible the-
ories behind them, is the fact that the correct answer used
to score each item on the test was not the truth of the
empirical generalization (e.g., the truth of whether, in gen-
eral, advertising does have a large effect on behavioral in-
tentions for low-involvement choices) but rather whether
the generalization held or not in that particular study. In
other words, the truth of the specific finding was the criterion
for correct answers, not the truth of the generalization.
As Kluger and Tikochinsky (2001) have pointed out, a test
of a hypothesis (a specific operationalization) cannot refute
an abstract generalization (an empirical generalization) and
neither, for that matter, can the failure of an empirical gen-
eralization, which is one derivation from a theory, refute that
theory. That is, the hierarchy in science is theory r empirical
generalization r hypothesis (a particular operationalization
of an empirical generalization). A theory is generative, that
is, it spawns a number of empirical generalizations (Eysenck
1997). Each empirical generalization can be tested (measured)
in numerous ways, not all of which are valid (see Rossiter
2002a). Correct answers on the Armstrong Test were thus at
the lowest scientific level and did not test knowledge of con-
sumer behavior theories, as intended, and did not test knowl-
edge of empirical generalizations.
Technical Criticisms of the Analysis
A technical criticism of the analysis in the Armstrong
Test is that the instructions led respondents to believe that
the distribution of true and false answers was (Arms-50 : 50
trong 1989, p. 14), as is usual on true-false tests, that is,
that the base rate of true being correct was 50%. In actuality,
74% of the hypotheses were true (Armstrong 1991, p. 253),
so that respondents using a strategy in accordance with the
stated base rate of correct answers would, on average, get
24% wrong due to overguessing of false. The realistic max-
imum score obtainable on the test would then be 76%, not
100%, a ceiling score closer to the mean scores that were
observed.
A further technical criticism, which makes the observed
scores even more debatable, is that directional outcomes
reported in the original studies were counted in the test as
supporting the hypotheses. The stricter criterion of statis-
tically significant outcomes should have been used (one-
tailed at the .05 level since the hypotheses made directional
predictions). Directional outcomes allow the dubious prac-
tice of treating, say, a mean difference of +1% in favor of
the hypothesis as supporting the hypothesis, and of 0% or
1% as rejecting it, or of a minuscule +.01 correlation
between two variables in the hypothesized direction as prov-
ing the hypothesis true. Lack of statistical significance of a
particular finding makes it less probable that a generalized
finding would be true (Hagen 1997; Nickerson 2001).
Explaining the Poor Results
It has already been suggested that consumer behavior
academics, and also marketing managers, would have no
advantage on the Armstrong Test if it tested particulars rather
than empirical generalizations. Moreover, with respect to the
poor performance by consumer behavior academics, the re-
sults from those academics who recalled having read the
particular study in the original were excluded, thus making
it less likely that those remaining could call on the relevant
empirical generalization.
Attesting to the difficulty of the task that the Armstrong
Test required of respondents were the high refusal rates. Of
100 consumer behavior academics approached, only 20 re-
sponded, and two of these were excluded because they said
they had read most of the studies, and a further two were
excused because they said they did not understand all the
hypotheses, leaving a final academic sample of . Ofn p 16
the 100 marketing practitioners from the AMA’s mailing
list who were invited to participate, only 13 responded, and
one of these was excused because he or she said they did
not understand the task itself, leaving a final practitioner
sample of . The high school students, on the othern p 12
hand, were virtually forced to participate, in class, giving a
student sample of . In the statistical analysis of then p 43
results, an attempt was made to compensate for these small
n’s by aggregating across hypotheses as well as respondents
(each respondent received about 26 of the 105 hypotheses
from the 20 studies). This is not a valid procedure because
the correct answers to the hypotheses within a study (there
were approximately five hypotheses from each of the five
studies given to each respondent) would not be independent.
In summary, the Armstrong Test cannot be regarded as
a valid test of scientific knowledge in consumer behavior.
The Armstrong Test gauged people’s ability to predict spe-
cific findings given the particular method of the study; it
did not test people’s knowledge of consumer behavior em-
pirical generalizations or of theories in consumer behavior.
This content downloaded from 130.130.37.84 on Thu, 31 Jul 2014 23:00:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
308 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
There are plausible reasons why the test produced such
strange results and why consumer behavior academics per-
formed so badly on the test.
WHAT WOULD BE A VALID TEST?
The construction of a valid test of scientific knowledge
in consumer behavior requires several carefully planned and
executed steps. First, the forms of consumer behavior knowl-
edge and their content domains must be determined. Second,
test items need to be generated, with the concepts in these
items translated into nontechnical language. Third, appro-
priate and unambiguous answer formats must be provided.
Fourth, a small set of experts in each consumer behavior
subdomain must ratify the items by providing a correct-
answer profile. Fifth, the items and the answer alternatives
must be pretested with a moderate-sized sample of layper-
sons representing the lowest consumer behavior education
population to whom the test might be administered, to pretest
for clarity of both the items and the answer formats. Sixth,
the test can then be administered to groups of persons dif-
fering in formal consumer behavior education. Seventh, to
score the test, answers should be compared with the best-
answer profile provided by the experts. Steps 1–4 are elab-
orated below.
Item Forms
In terms of the forms of consumer behavior knowledge
to be tested, it would be acceptable to limit these to structural
frameworks (microtheories) and empirical generalizations
(microfindings). As proposed previously, consumer behavior
concepts, which are the elemental form of consumer be-
havior knowledge, would be given in the test items as lay
translations rather than being tested separately. One reason
for this is that a test of scientific jargon, in consumer be-
havior as in any other discipline, would artificially discrim-
inate in favor of those people who have had formal education
in the field. Another reason is that unless these concepts are
translated, answers to the test items covering structural
frameworks and empirical generalizations will be con-
founded by indeterminacy of whether failure on the item
was due to lack of understanding of the concept descriptions
or lack of the knowledge expressed therein.
Item Content
The content of the items would be selected by polling
experts—ideal for this task would be the JCR editorial board
and the journal’s reviewers. Experts in each subdomain of
consumer behavior would be polled. These subdomains
could be the same as the content/subject areas used by this
journal for potential reviewers to indicate their areas of ex-
pertise: “advertising; aesthetic/hedonic consumption; . . .
word of mouth/opinion leadership.”
The experts would be asked to provide four types of
items—without regard, at this stage, for the degree of em-
pirical support for the item. The items would consist of
• Useful structural frameworks or models in that subdo-
main
• Popular but less useful, even discredited, structural
frameworks or models
• Empirical generalizations about consumer behavior in
that subdomain (although stated as generalizations, they
would be quite specific as to content, as in the example
of advertising’s influence on choice behavior in low-
involvement and high-involvement decision situations)
• Mythical empirical generalizations (common miscon-
ceptions)
False-knowledge items, namely, questionable frameworks
or models and common misconceptions about consumer be-
havior, are necessary types of items to be included on the
test. These items are necessary theoretically because the
eradication of false knowledge is as important as the in-
culcation of true knowledge. Also, such items are needed
to ensure an even distribution of true and false answers on
the test. Tests of popular misconceptions have been used
extensively in psychology to assess people’s scientific
knowledge of the field, beginning with the test developed
by McKeachie (1960) and formalized by E. Vaughan (1977)
in her 80-item Test of Common Beliefs. Gardner and Hund
(1983), using a sample of 20 of the most extremely falsely
believed items, found that these items discriminated signif-
icantly, as expected, between psychology faculty and nonps-
ychology faculty.
Answer Format
The next step needing explanation is the selection of an
answer format for the items. In the Armstrong Test, the
answer alternatives were “true,” “false,” and “do not un-
derstand.” The do not understand answer alternative should
not be necessary with well-constructed items (not if tech-
nical terms in the items have been translated into everyday
language and the item wording has been pretested for
clarity). But the “mostly true–mostly false” or simple “true-
false” answer format that is typically used for knowledge
tests (e.g., Armstrong 1991; Gordon, Kleiman, and Hanie
1978; and Vaughan 1977) is not accurate. This can be il-
lustrated by considering items of degree and items of degree
and direction. For an item of degree, consider the empirical
generalization that “personality shows only a small rela-
tionship with brand preferences.” An answer of “mostly
true” for this item could refer ambiguously to alternative
interpretations, including reference to most, though not all,
specific personality traits showing a small relation; most
studies of personality traits and brand choice revealing a
small relation; or even that the average relationship is not
quite as large as “small.” An answer of “mostly false” is
also uninformative, as it could refer variously to the re-
spondent’s belief that the relationship is a lot smaller than
“small,” that is, zero; or that the relationship is indeed a lot
larger, which of course are two very different answers re-
flecting two very different interpretations of the state of
being false. Items that involve both degree and direction are
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still more problematic. For instance, how could a respondent
appropriately answer the item, “Recent new car buyers are
less likely to subsequently pay attention to ads for the make
and model of car they have just bought”? “Mostly false” or
simply “false” would capture neither the fact that the re-
lationship is typically in the opposite direction nor the av-
erage strength of that relationship. As can be shown with
the Armstrong Test (and with the tests in psychology), the
true-false answer format cannot accurately capture the re-
spondent’s state of knowledge.
Instead, the test constructor must work much harder and
devise concrete answer alternatives specific to each item.
For each item, one of the answer alternatives would be the
best answer given by experts (see below) and the others
would be plausible distracters. The provision of five answer
alternatives would keep the proportion of correct answers
obtainable by guessing at a fairly low level (about 20%).
The alternatives should exclude the global “none of the
above” or “all of the above.” For instance, alternatives for
the car-buyer item and advertising might be: “very much
less likely,” “less likely,” “neither less nor more likely,”
“more likely,” or “much more likely.” For items that refer
to structural frameworks or models, the answer alternatives
would include one answer listing the correct components
and four others listing erroneous but plausible components.
For instance, for Huff’s retail gravitation law, the correct
(best) answer would state that patronage is directly propor-
tional to retail selling space and inversely proportional to
travel time. The distracter answers might refer to plausible
erroneous variations of Huff’s determinants of patronage,
such as number of product categories and travel distance.
Answer Ratification (Scoring)
In the next step, experts in the respective subdomains of
consumer behavior would be engaged to ratify the best an-
swers and provide an answer profile for the items pertaining
to their area of expertise. Knowledge in the social sciences
consists of best beliefs held by experts (Rossiter 2001,
2002b) as there are no absolute truths. The experts doing
the ratification should be subdomain experts (specialists).
Experience from another ambitious study is instructive here.
Miner (1984) assessed 32 established theoretical frame-
works from the domain of personnel management in terms
of their scientific validity. For these assessments, he intended
to rely on the judgments of the 35 knowledgeable scholars
who nominated the frameworks. However, he found that he
could not use a full count of the panel for the assessments
because his own extensive analysis of the literature revealed
that many of the experts were not fully up-to-date—except
with regard to the evidence pertaining to the several frame-
works in their area of specialization. There is little doubt
that the distribution of current scientific knowledge would
be similarly uneven among academics in consumer behavior.
Scores on the test would thus be derived on the basis of
an expertly ratified, best-answers profile. Scores would be
zero-one for each item, regardless of the closeness of the
four alternative distracters per item, as the purpose is to seek
precise best beliefs rather than to encourage even close mis-
conceptions. With the many subdomains of consumer be-
havior knowledge, with several microtheories, microfindings
and misconceptions and erroneously believed findings, a
total test comprising 250 to 300 items would be required.
This is not a test of ability but rather knowledge, so a smaller
sample of items cannot be substituted. However, it is pos-
sible that shorter yet comprehensive subtests of subdomain
knowledge would find applications.
CONCLUSION
Consumer behavior, as an established if evolving disci-
pline, should have available a compendium of scientific
knowledge in its domain. This collection would have to go
beyond textbooks and be drawn from an assessment of many
articles, by experts. By using the conceptual approach and
method described in this article, a valid test of consumer
behavior knowledge can be constructed. The test would be
useful for assessing the consumer behavior knowledge ac-
quired by business educators, consultants, managers, market
researchers, and business students.
[David Glen Mick served as editor and Kent B. Monroe
served as associate editor for this article.]
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